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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH#
Plaintiff/Respondent,
v.
JOHN QUAS#
:

Case No. 890601-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant•
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In addition to relying on and reasserting the contents
of his opening brief, Mr. Quas replies to Appellee's Brief as
follows:
Mr. Quas maintains that the district court had
jurisdiction to quash the improper bindover in this case.
Given the confusion in the district courts concerning
jurisdiction over bindover quashal prior to the Gordan, Humphreyy
and Mathews opinions, the continuing uncertainty of the
conclusion reached in the Gordan# Humphrey, and Mathews opinions#
and Mr. Quas' position that bindover quashal lies within the
jurisdiction of the district courts, this Court should address
the merits of Mr. Quas' successive preliminary hearing/due
process argument.
In reviewing the merits of the due process issuef there
are two relevant questions before this Court: 1) what is the
standard for reversing the dismissal of informations for
insufficient evidence? and 2) did the State meet this standard?
The State's proposed standard leaves the discretion for
1

refiling informations with the prosecutors, and thus violates
the fundamental intent of the Brickey decision.
Applying the correct standard for reversal of
dismissals (requiring new or previously unavailable evidence that
has surfaced, or other good cause) in this case leads to the
conclusions that the prosecution did not meet the standard, and
that the reversal of the dismissal order in this case violated
Mr. Quas1 right to due process of law.
The State's profile evidence and argument that Susan
Quas was murdered because other suicide victims behave
differently than she did were plain error.

Even if the State's

experts were qualified to render their opinions that it was
unlikely that Susan Quas committed suicide because she did not
fit within the behavioral profile of suicide victims, the
opinions should have been excluded because the prejudicial
impact of this testimony outweighed its probative value.
In reviewing the admission of Mr. Quas" custodial
statements, the trial court failed to apply Utah Constitutional
law relied on by Mr. Quas, apparently following the prosecutor's
argument that the State Constitutional precedent was superseded
by Federal Constitutional law promulgated by federal courts.
After correcting the trial court's error of law in
finding federal precedent controlling over Utah Constitutional
precedent, this Court should apply the proper Utah standard and
find that Mr. Quas' custodial statements were taken in violation
of his right against self-incrimination.
2

The State•s arguments that Mr. Quas' statements to
police officers, presented in the State's case-in-chief, were
impeachment evidence; that this issue was waived; and that the
admission of the statements was rendered harmless by the
admission of the statements themselves and other evidence are
incorrect.
When read in context, Susan Quas1 statements that the
police would one day come to the Quas residence to find that Mr.
Quas had killed her, and that Mr. Quas was the guilty one do not
reflect a state of mind sufficiently relevant to Mrs. Quas'
behavior on the night of her death to justify the enormously
prejudicial impact of their admission.
Mr. Quas was entitled to have the jury instructed
correctly on his theory of the case and the applicable law.
ARGUMENT
I.
DISTRICT COURTS HAVE
JURISDICTION TO QUASH IMPROPER
BINDOVER ORDERS.
Mr. Quas stands by his argument that district courts
1
have jurisdiction to quash bindover orders.
While this Court's
opinions in the Gordan, Humphrey, and Mathews cases rule
otherwise, a petition for certiorari will be filed in the Utah
Supreme Court in those cases.
II.
THIS COURT SHOULD
REACH THE MERITS OF THE
IMPROPER BINDOVER ISSUE.
1

See Point II of Appellant's opening brief.
3

At the time the trial court in the instant case ruled
that it did not have jurisdiction over the magistrate's bindover
order, there was a good deal of confusion in the district courts
over the jurisdictional question.

See petition for interlocutory

appeal filed in State v. Gordan, Case No. 890130 (appending three
different district court rulings on the issue).
Citing Utah Code Ann. section 78-2-2(3)(h) (Supp.
1989), and State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 270 (Utah 1985), the
State claims that Mr. Quas should have sought an interlocutory
2
appeal from the bindover order in the Utah Supreme Court.
While that code section does provide Utah Supreme Court
jurisdiction over "interlocutory appeals from any court of record
involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony,", the
magistrate who issued the bindover order was not acting as a
court of record in presiding over the preliminary hearings.
While Schreuder does contain language indicating that the Utah
Supreme Court's interlocutory appeal jurisdiction "governs"
appeals from bindover orders, the language is dicta* .
2

Appellee's brief at 12-13.

3
See Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325, 1327 (Utah
1977)(magistrate is separate statutory jurisdiction, and those
acting as magistrates do not invoke the jurisdiction of other
(i.e. circuit) courts); Utah Code Ann. section 78-1-1; 78-1-2
(omitting magistrates from enumeration of courts of record).
4
In Schreuder, the defendant claimed that because his
preliminary hearing took place in the trial court, he was
deprived equal protection of the law because he did not have a
higher court to go to for review of the bindover order. The
Supreme Court reviewed the bindover order, thus ensuring him
equal protection of the law. The court apparently was not faced
with nor reached the question of its jurisdiction to do so.
4

Mr* Quas maintains that the district court should have
exercised its jurisdiction to quash the improper bindover order#
and that this Court should both clarify the jurisdictional issue
and address the propriety of the bindover order in this case.
III.
THE STATE FAILED TO MEET
THE PROPER STANDARD FOR
REVERSAL OF THE INITIAL DISMISSAL
OF THE INFORMATION.
Mr. Quas, after analyzing and quoting extensively from
the Brickey decision and cases cited therein, proposed as the
standard for reversal of dismissals of informations based on
insufficient evidence the following: "[T]he prosecutor [must]
show that new or previously unavailable evidence has surfaced or
that other good cause justifies refiling."

It is Mr. Quas1

position that when the refiling of the information is based on
new or previously unavailable evidence, "new or previously
unavailable" means evidence that was not available to the State
at the first preliminary hearing.
The State apparently would have this Court adopt the
standard allowing reversal of dismissals of informations when the
prosecution presents "such evidence that with due diligence could
have been available at the first preliminary examination."
The Harper language quoted by the State in support of
5
Appellant's opening brief at 15 through 21, quoting
State v. Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986)(emphasis added).
6

Appellant's opening brief at 17.

7
Appellee's brief at 15, quoting Harper v. District
Court, 484 P.2d 891, 897 (Okla. 1971).
5

its proposed standard for refiling appears to contain a
typographical error (missing the word not, provided in brackets
below), particularly when read in context,
We point out further, that the Jones v..
State, supra, decision does not preclude the
district attorney from offering for further
consideration - a charge - which was
dismissed at an ecirlier preliminary
examination, when additional newly discovered
evidence is later obtained; meaning however,
such evidence that with due diligence could
[not] have been available at the first
preliminary examination. That decision
merely requires that the prosecutor may not
take his dismissed case - with the same
evidence - refile it - and submit it to a
magistrate more likely to be favorable.
That decision requires that the first
magistrate, who considered the information
and evidence; and rendered a decision; shall
consider the good cause offered and the new
evidence, in relation to that upon which his
earlier decision was premised. In short, for
good cause shown, and subject to the
presentment of new evidenced the charge may
be refiled.
Harper, at 897.

Subsequent Oklahoma case law on the standard for

refiling informations supports Mr. Quas" reading of Harper.

See

e.g., Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616, 620 (Okl.Cr. Sept. 1,
1971)("At the outset of such a preliminary the State has the
burden to convince the examining magistrate that there is
additional new evidence not presented and unavailable at the
previous preliminary which requires re-examination of the
dismissal.")(emphasis added); Chase v. State, 517 P.2d 1142,
1143-1144 (Okla.Cr. 1973)(We stated in that case [Jones] that
"new" or "additional" evidence does not mean that which was known
to the State at the time of the first preliminary or that which
6

could have been easily acquired by it,

481 P.2d at 171....The

magistrate must decide if the substance of the new evidence
offered is sufficient to overcome the prior dismissal and whether
the State has shown good cause why that evidence was not
available to it at the first preliminary hearing.")(emphasis
added)•
Assuming that the State's interpretation of the Harper
opinion were the governing standard in Oklahoma, such a standard
would grant prosecutors completely unbridled discretion to refile
cases, and would directly contradict the Brickey court's explicit
intention to remove discretion for refiling cases from the
8
prosecution.
Additionally, the holding of the Harper case relied on
by the State is not applicable to refiling informations, but
instead provides guidance for granting continuances in those
preliminary hearings where prosecutors innocently miscalculate
the quantum of evidence necessary to make a showing of probable
cause and have evidence reasonably available to present at the
continuation without causing undue delay. 9

Even if the Harper

8

Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah 1986).

9

The Harper court explained,
[I]n the event the prosecutor
miscalculates and fails to present sufficient
evidence to show probable cause to bind over
the accused, but possesses other witnesses
whose testimony would strengthen his showing,
it is clearly within the discretion of the
examining magistrate to grant the state a
continuance for that purpose. However, it is
presumed that the additional witnesses, or
7

continuance standard were applicable to cases involving
refilings, it is inapplicable in this case, which involved a
prosecutor consciously refusing to present the pivotal gunshot
residue evidence requested by the magistrate to support probable
cause (T.814 2-5, 7 ) , rather than a prosecutor innocently
miscalculating the necessary quantum of evidenceThe State's characterization of Mr. Qucis ' proposed
standard as a standard requiring new evidence to "jump out of the
bushes",

presents an unduly limited reading of the Brickey

standard, which allows refiling when the prosecution presents new
evidence or other good cause for refiling.

Brickey, 714 P.2d at

647.

In cases in which the State is unable to me*et the new
12
evidence prong of the Brickey refiling standard,. the State has
the opportunity to make a showing that other good cause exists
for refiling.
other evidence, are reasonably available; and
that a continuance will not be sought in
order to conduct further investigation
seeking that evidence, in a dilatory mcinner.
Harper v. District Court of Oklahoma County, 484 P.2d 891, 892
(Okla. Cr. April 21, 1971).
10
The Brickey court properly noted the application of
that Harper rule to continuances to accommodate prosecutors
innocently miscalculating the quantum of evidence necessary.
Brickey, 714 P.2d 644, 647 n.5 (Utah 1986).
11

Appellee's brief at 14.

12
The only evidence presented in this case by the State
that was unavailable at the first preliminary heciring was the
testimony of Kristine Knudson, which showed inconsistencies in
Mr. Quas's statements, which inconsistencies the magistrate had
already noted at the first preliminary hearing. See Appellant's
opening brief at 23-24.
8

The State's effort to assuage the Brickey due process
violation by arguing that the magistrate was wrong in her
13
original dismissal of the information for lack of evidence
is
neither the proper mode of challenging the magistrate's
14
dismissal nor relevant to this appeal.
IV.
THE ADMISSION OF
THE EXPERT TESTIMONY
CONCERNING THE BEHAVIORAL PROFILE
OF SUICIDE VICTIMS
WAS PLAIN ERROR.
In State v. Braun# 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah App.
1990)# this Court explained that the plain error doctrine is used
as a tool to see that justice is done# in the following manner:
We note that the two plain error
requirements of obviousness and harmfulness
are related and that the obviousness
requirement poses no rigid and insurmountable
barrier to review. For examplef the more
harmful an error is# the more likely an
appellate court is to conclude that it was
objectively obvious, because a high degree of
harmfulness might be expected to attract a
trial court's attention. On the other hand/
in appropriate cases we can exercise our
discretion to dispense with the requirement
of obviousness# so that justice can be done#
as when an error not readily apparent to the
court or counsel proves harmful in
retrospect.
... At bottom^ the plain error rule's
purpose is to permit us to avoid injustice.
No statement of the factors that are
important to our deliberations on the point
should be read to limit our power to achieve
13

Appellee's brief at 16# n.5# 17-20# 25.

14
See Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(3)(a) (providing
State an appeal from dismissal); Boggess v. Morris9 635 P.2d 39#
42 (Utah 1981)(prosecution may resort to extraordinary writ if
information is improperly dismissed).
9

that end.
Id. at page 49, quoting State v. Eldredge# 773 P.2d 29, 35 n.8
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 62 (1989).
The admission of the expert testimony and argument that
Susan Quas was murdered because her behavior did not fit the
profile of suicide victims was obvious error - it violated both
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 and 403.

Neither Dr. Grey nor Mr.

Marchant was qualified to present expert testimony on the
behavioral profile of suicide victims, and even if the proper
foundation had been laid, such testimony was unduly prejudicial,
given its lack of probative value.

Compare the evidence and

argument in this case with the facts and rulings in State v.
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986)(the police officer in the Rammel
case should not have presented testimony concerning a profile of
the behavior of criminals and the defendant's fitting that
profile, because of his lack of qualification and because the
statistical, or profiling evidence was not sufficiently probative
to outweigh its prejudicial effect); and State v. Rimmasch, 776
P.2d 388, 403 n.13 and 401-403 (Utah 1989)(citing Rammel to
explain that profile evidence on behavior of typical abused
children is improper because it has "a tendency to mislead and
confuse a finder of fact by suggesting that the issue to be
decided is whether the accusing child possesses these
characteristics rather than whether the child experienced the
specific instances of abuse described"; and discussing the heavy
foundational burden that precedes the presentation of expert
10

profiling testimony).
The prosecution1s heavy reliance on the improper
15
profiling testimony (T. 184-185# 890, 907-908, 945-946)
underscores the harmful nature of its admission, and suggests
that this Court should exercise its discretion under the harmless
error doctrine to correct the trial court and reverse Mr. Quas1
conviction.

Braun, supra.
V.
THE CARNER DECISION GOVERNS
THE SELF-INCRIMINATION ISSUE
IN THIS CASE.

A. IN ADOPTING THE STATE'S POSITION THAT FEDERAL PRECEDENTS
SUPERSEDED A CASE DECIDED UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, THE TRIAL
COURT VIOLATED A BASIC TENET OF FEDERALISM.
When the issue of Mr. Quas' statements to the police
officers was raised in the suppression hearing, Mr. Quas was
relying explicitly on Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P.2d 1168
(Utah 1983)(M.H. 84), which was explicitly decided under Article
I section 12 of the Utah Constitution.

664 P.2d 1168, 1172. The

prosecutor argued that subsequent federal case law had
superseded the Carner opinion, and had repudiated the earner
15
On appeal, it is the State's theory that because the
expert testimony and argument discussed the "manner of death" of
Susan Quas, and did not formally reach the question of Mr. Quas's
having murdered Susan, the evidence was acceptable. Appellee's
brief at 27 and n. 10.
The State's argument concerning the propriety of the
prosecution's discussing Susan Quas's manner of death
misconstrues the issue before this Court. There is no question
that it is appropriate for the State to present evidence and
argument directly on the point of Mr. Quas's guilt. However,
attempting to prove that Mr. Quas murdered Susan because she did
not commit suicide because she did not fit within the behavioral
profile of suicide victims is an improper mode of proof. See
Rammel and Rimmasch, supra.
11

factor relating to the focus of the investigation (R. 439-445;
M.H. 88).

The trial court apparently believed this argument

and focused solely on the absence of indicia of arrest in
declining to suppress the statements.
Federal interpretations of federal case law do not
supersede state court interpretations of state constitutions.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984).

The federal

precedents relied on by the State at trial and on appeal do not
overrule earner, which is a precedent interpreting Article I
18
section 12 of the Utah Constitution.
Aside from this precept of federalism, there is good
reason for this Court to maintain the integrity of the Carner
decision and its inquiry into the focus of the investigation.

As

this case demonstrates, if Miranda warnings are only required
when guns are drawn and handcuffs are locked, police officers can
manipulate the standard, giving warnings only in cases when
suspects force their own arrest by physically attempting to leave
the police.

To extend the length of a pre-Miranda interrogation,

a police officer need only avoid formal arrest.
16
Under Carner, the factors to be considered to determine
if a suspect is entitled to Miranda warnings are:
(1) the site of the interrogation; (2)
whether the investigation focused on the
accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of
arrest were present; and (4) the length and
form of interrogation.
Id. at 1171 (emphasis added).
17
The trial court's ruling is contained in Appendix 4 of
Appellant's opening brief.
18

Carner, 664 P.2d at 1272.
12

In this case, the police suspected that John Quas had
murdered Susan Quas prior to entering or within minutes of
19
entering the Quas residence.
Three or four police officers
surrounded Mr. Quas, would not let him get up from the kitchen
table to get a drink or call a friend, took his car keys away,
offered to let him call a friend to come and get him, took him to
the police station prior to letting him call the friend, told him
he was not under arrest, and interrogated him, all without
Miranda warnings, until Officer Edwards began tape recording the
20
interrogation.
Officer Edwards indicated at the suppression
hearing that the only reason that he gave Mr. Quas the warnings
prior to the taped interview was that he was "[bjeing cautious."
(M.H. 71).
In the State's only recognition of the earner case on
21
appeal,

the State argues that Mr. Quas was not entitled to

Miranda warnings because no police officer said to him, "John
22
Quas, I accuse you of murdering your wife."
This argument
19

Appellant's opening brief 45-48.

20

Appellant's opening brief at 45-47.

21
The State again relies primarily on federal precedents.
Appellee's brief at 32-34.
22

The State argues,
[T]he court [in earner] elaborated on
factors it considered when
determining whether an accused who
has not been formally arrested is
in custody. They are: (1) the site
of the interrogation; (2) whether
the investigation focused on the
accused; (3) whether the objective
indicia of arrest were present; and
13

places undue emphasis on the word "accused" in the earner
opinion, which word was merely used as a synonym for person.
Focus of the investigation, not formal accusation, is a
precursor to Miranda warnings.

See earner factor 2, 664 P.2d at

1171 (focus of the investigation), and Appellant's opening brief
at 45 through 50 (showing that Mr. Quas was the focus of the
investigation from moments after the investigation began).
This Court should maintain the tradition under the Utah
Constitution of providing uniquely broad protection to the right
23
against self incrimination,
and reverse the trial court's error

(4) the length and form of
interrogation. • . .
• •• In light of Carner, it is important to
note that here defendant was accused of
nothing at the time of his interview with
Detective Edwards and that at that time it
had not been ascertained yet that a crime had
been committed.* Police considered both
homicide and suicide as possibilities,* and
Dr. Grey had not conducted the autopsy.
Defendant was a suspect in the investigation
as it related to the possibilities of
homicide, but none of the objective indicia
of arrest was present (S.H. 76-77)....
Appellee's brief at 34 (emphasis by the State).
*note the absence of supporting record citations.
23
See Carner, supray State v. Ruggeri, 429 P.2d 969
(Utah 1967)(under Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution,
it was improper to fail to warn a witness at grand jury
proceedings that he was the target of the investigation); In Re
Criminal Investigation, 754 P.2d 633 (Utah 1988)(under Article I
section 12 of the Utah Constitution, in exercising subpoena
powers, the attorney general must warn those upon whom the
investigation focuses that they are the target of the
investigation).
14

of law in failing to follow the controlling Utah law.H
B. MR. QUAS' OBJECTIONS TO THE STATEMENTS TAKEN AT HIS RESIDENCE
WERE NOT WAIVED.
The State argues that Mr. Quas has waived his
opportunity to object to the statements taken at the Quas
residence# and is limited to discussing the statements made at
the police station.25
Mr. Quas' motion to suppress encompassed "any and all"
statements taken in violation of his rights (R. 412). The trial
court's legal error in failing to apply the earner analysis
would not have been corrected by further emphasizing the
statements made at the Quas residence, and thus seems to moot the
waiver argument.

Nonetheless, the circumstances at the Quas

residence were discussed at the hearing on the motion to
suppress.
While at the hearing on the motion to suppress, defense
counsel's primary focus was on the statements made to Officer
Edwards at the police station, the facts surrounding the
interrogation at the Quas residence were discussed by Mr. Quas.
Although his memory of the events was poor, he indicated that
there were three or four police officers present and that he had
spoken with Officer Edwards (M.H. 48-51).

Mr. Quas also

indicated that prior to leaving the Quas residence, when Officer
24
This Court owes the trial court no deference in
correcting the trial court's error of law. Western Fiberglass v.
Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, 789 P.2d 34, 37 (Utah App. 1990).
25

Appellee's Brief at 29 through 31.
15

Edwards offered to let him call a friend to pick him up, he did
not call the friend because Officer Edwards told him he was going
to the police station (M.H. 54). Mr. Quas indicated that Officer
Edwards first read him his rights during the interview at the
police station (M.H. 55).
Officer Edwards also testified that he spoke with Mr.
Quas at his home (M.H. 67). He indicated that Mr. Quas was taken
to the police station by Officer Cox (M.H. 74). When first asked
if Mr. Quas was free to leave his residence, Officer Edwards
indicated that the thought had not crossed anyone's mind, but
that he "imagined" Mr. Quas was free to leave. When the
prosecutor, in the next question, asked him again if Mr. Quas was
free to leave his home and not go to the police station. Officer
Edwards indicated that he was (M.H. 68-69).
Officer Edwards indicated that at the Quas residence,
prior to Mr. Quas' transportation to the police station,
Officer Edwards suspected that Mr. Quas had murdered Susan (M.H.
76), and that Mr. Quas was the strongest suspect in his mind
(M.H. 78).
While the trial court's ruling focused primarily on the
circumstances at the police station, the trial court did mention
that the record was "very unclear" about whether or not the
circumstances at the Quas residence prior to Mr. Quas' going to
2 ft

the police department were voluntary.
26

The trial court's findings state,
...Defendant indicated that he wanted to
leave. It would appear, through the record
16

The language of the motion in limine and the legal and
factual issues discussed at the suppression hearing are adequate
to preserve this issue for appeal.
However, this Court should further consider the fact
that the State did not reveal the strongest evidence of custody
(Carner factor 3) justifying suppression of the statements at the
Quas residence and at the police station until Officer Spann
testified at trial, and indicated that at the Quas residence, he
and the other Officers forced Mr. Quas to stay at the kitchen
table and did not allow him to get up to get a drink or make a
27
phone call (T. 353, 360).
Up until Officer Spann's testimony,
is very unclear, that Officer Lamont Cox
asked Defendant if he wanted to go to the
West Valley Police Station, and Defendant
responded in the affirmative.
R. 446 (Appendix 4 of Appellant's Opening Brief).
27
When Officer Spann tried to obtain a transcript of his
tape recorded police report made on the night of Susan Quas's
death, Officer Edwards told him that he could not find it (T.
342-343). In fact, the report could not be found through
subsequent efforts (T. 343).
The State argues,
....

[A] review of Sgt. Spann's testimony at the preliminary
hearing and trial reveals no material differences.
Even if Sgt. Spann testified in greater detail at
trial, the defense not only had access to his police
report before the preliminary hearing but also had
ample opportunity to cross examine him then.
Appellee's brief at 10 n. 4.
After Mr. Quas moved to supplement the record with a
copy of Officer Spann's police report, this Court indicated that
because the report was not presented to the court at trial,
reliance on the report on appeal is improper.
In Officer Spann's preliminary hearing testimony (P.H.2
17-23), his only reference to the custodial circumstances of Mr.
Quas at the Quas residence again was "Once we were able to get
Mr. Quas into the kitchen area..." (P.H. 2 20). See Appendix 2.
The preliminary hearing focused on probable cause,

17

every other police officer had indicated that Mr, Quas was not
physically restrained or detained*2 8
The late revelation of this evidence by the State
explains why defense counsel was not aware of the need to further
emphasize the statements taken at the Quas residence/ and
explains why this Court should adopt the order of proof discussed
in State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 185 (Utah 1943), and Appellant's
29
opening brief at 42-43.
rather than admissibility of evidence, and thus did not focus on
the custodial nature of Mr. Quas's interrogation on the night of
Susan's death. Indeed, after the motion to suppress had been
resolved against Mr. Quas, it is a fortunate coincidence that
Officer Spann's testimony relating to the custodial nature of Mr.
Quas's interrogation was revealed at trial.
28
For example, at the suppression hearing, Officer
Edwards indicated that Mr. Quas was free to leave from his
residence (M.H. 69) and from the police station (M.H. 72-73).
Apparently because the police had seized Mr. Quas's car keys for
"evidence" (M.H. 80), Officer Edwards testified that he asked Mr.
Quas if he had a friend to come and pick him up at the police
station prior to the taped interview (M.H. 70). Officer Edwards
testified that he got the telephone number of Mr. Quas's friend,
Russ Wagner, out of the phone book, gave the to Mr. Quas, and
directed him to call Mr. Wagner up (M.H. 70).
29
The State's effort to distinguish the Crank case by
noting that the court chose the word "confession", while Mr. Quas
uses the words "custodial statements". Appellee's brief at 37
n.15, perhaps can be resolved by noting that yet a third synonym
is used in the constitutional provision interpreted in Crank, and
raised explicitly in Mr. Quas's motion to suppress (R. 412),
Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution: "The accused
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself."
(emphasis added).
The State's argument that this Utah Constitutional
argument has not been briefed adequately for this Court to
address it on appeal, Appellee's brief at 37 n.15, is rebutted
through reference to State v. Jewett, 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985),
which was cited by the Utah Supreme Court as a "summary of
scholarly commentary and analytic technique" in briefing of state
constitutional issues. State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah
1986). In Jewett, the court stated,
18

C. THE STATEMENTS WERE NOT PRESENTED AS IMPEACHMENT, AND THEIR
ADMISSION WAS NOT HARMLESS.
The State argues that the statements in question were
30
permissible as impeachment evidence.
The State introduced this
evidence, as promised in its opening argument (T. 183, 188) as
part of its case in chief (T. 241, 287-288, 305, 338, 375-376,
344, 392, 375-378, 453-460, 474) before Mr. Quas testified (T.
803-861).

In these circumstances, the evidence does not qualify

as impeachment evidence under the precedents relied on by the
State.

E.g. State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 1107, 1112-1113 (Utah App.

1988)(statements are used to "attack the credibility of
defendant's trial testimony", and should be accompanied with jury
instructions on limited use of the evidence); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971)(statements rendered inadmissible in the
prosecution's case-in-chief may be used to impeach the
credibility of trial testimony).
Mr. Quas agrees that there is no Sixth Amendment issue
31
.
32
before this Court,
and to his knowledge, has not raised one.
When a state constitutional issue is squarely
raised on appeal, and it appears the issue
has possible merit, if the briefing is
inadequate, we will order a rebriefing or
address the issue. Otherwise it will seem
that we are "decided only to be undecided,
resolved to be irresolute, adamant for drift,
... all-powerful for impotence."
Id. at 236, quoting W. Churchill, While England Slept (1938).
30

Appellee's brief at 37 through 38.

31

Appellee's Brief at 38 n. 17.

19

The argument that the admission of the statements to
the police officers was harmless error in light of the
presentation of the statements themselves and other evidence
33
presented at trial,
should be evaluated in light of the
emphasis the prosecution placed on the statements in opening and
closing argument (T. 183, 188, 894-902), in light of the improper
nature of other evidence relied on by the State, and in light of
the fact that this constitutional violation requires this Court
to find any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Chapman v.

California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)•
VI.
THE ADMISSION OF SUSAN QUAS" STATEMENTS
WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR.
The State acknowledges that under controlling
precedents, in order to admit Susan Quas' statements that one
day the police would come and find her dead, to find that her
husband had killed her and was the guilty one, the State should
have demonstrated that the statements were probative of "the
decedent's state of mind at the time of the killing.

However,

on appeal, as at trial, the State fails to make the requisite
showing. The State argues that the statements were admitted to
rebut the claim that Susan Quas committed suicide, but fails to
32
But see Appellant's opening brief at page 50-51,
indicating that once Mr. Quas was informed of his Miranda rights,
Officer Edwards violated Mr. Quas's right against selfincrimination, in continuing to interrogate Mr. Quas after Mr.
Quas invoked his right to counsel.
33

Appellee's brief at 38.

34

Appellee's brief at 40.
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explain how, taken in context, they do so.
As noted extensively in Appellant's Opening Brief, an
examination of the contexts in which the statements were made
does not support this argument.

See Appellant's Brief at 53-56.

The State's claim that the evidence was necessary to
rebut the suicide claim raised by the defense#

should be

evaluated in light of the State's expert testimony that Susan
Quas was not a suicidal person (T. 721-735).

See State v. Auble,

754 P.2d 935, 938 (Utah 1988).
While the trial court gave repeated instructions on the
abstract concept of limited use of evidencef37 such instructions
are not an adequate assurance that the evidence will be limited
to its proper use.

See State v. Auble# 754 P.2d 935# 937 (Utah

1988); State v. Wauneka, 560 P.2d 1377, 1379-1381 (Utah 1977);
prosecutor's argument to the trial court that statements were
admissible to show the identity of the murderer (T. 278).
VII.
MR. QUAS WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE
THE JURORS INSTRUCTED PROPERLY.
Mr. Quas was entitled to have the jurors instructed
properly on his theory of the case and the law.
35

State v. Potter,

Appellee's brief at 40.

36

Appellee's brief at 40-41.
Given Susan Quas's proclivity toward guns# drinking,
and feigning suicide, and her condition on the night of her
death, Mr. Quas's defense was not limited to suicide, but also
encompassed the possibility that Susan had an accident (T. 193#
915).
37

Appellee's Brief at 41.
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627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981).
A. FLIGHT INSTRUCTION
The State argues that the trial court was correct in
denying Mr. Quas' requested flight instruction because there was
no basis for it in the record.38

At the time of trial, defense

counsel had to make the best of the trial court's ruling that Mr.
Quas was not in custody and spent the evening with the police
voluntarily, and thus sought to establish Mr. Quas1 cooperation
with the police (T. 360).39
Although the State claims that jury instructions 5
through 11 were cumulative to Mr. Quas' requested flight
instruction and made it unnecessary for the trial court to give
the instruction,

a review of those instructions indicates that

the instructions do not convey the information in the instruction
requested by Mr. Quas.

See Appendix 3 to this brief, including

instructions 5 through 11.
B. PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION
The trial court's "statements" to the prospective
jurors concerning the meaning of the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof, and the prosecutor's opening argument
concerning the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof were
38

Appellee's brief at 43.

39
The absence of explicit argument on point is explained
by the trial court's ruling that instructing on the inferences to
be drawn from Mr. Quas's failure to flee would be an improper
comment on the evidence.
40

Appellee's brief at 43-44.
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incorrect statements of the law*

Rather than correcting this

error by giving the instruction requested by the defense, which
instruction is a clear statement of the law, the trial court
instructed the jurors that doubt is reasonable when it "is based
on reason", when it is "reasonable in view of all the evidence"#
and when it would be held by "reasonable men and women".
Instruction 7.

The instruction requested by the defense was more

concrete and understandable and should have been given (R. 596).
State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75f 80 (Utah 1981).
CONCLUSION
Because the original dismissal of this case should not
have been overturned, this Court should reverse Mr. Quas•
conviction, and order the case dismissed.

At the least, Mr. Quas

is entitled to a new trial comporting with his constitutional
rights, and other laws governing fair trials,
Respectfully submitted this //]

day of

^HAC\.

L™i

1990.
LISA J. RJtMAL
Attorney for Appellant
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See Appellant's Opening Brief at 62 to 65.
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APPENDIX 1
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
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TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-1 (1953 as amended) provides:
78-1-1. Courts of justice enumerated.
The following are the courts of justice of this
state:
(1) the Supreme Court;
(2) the Court of Appeals;
(3) the district courts;
(4) the circuit courts;
(5) the juvenile courts; and
(6) the justices7 courts.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-1-2 (1953 as amended) provides:
78-1-2. Courts of record enumerated.
The courts enumerated in the first five subdivisions
[subsections] of the preceding section [§ 78-1-1]
are courts of record.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1990) provides in pertinent part:
78-2-2.

Supreme Court jurisdiction.

(3) The Supreme Court has appellate
jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(h) interlocutory appeals from any
court of record involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26 provides in pertinent part:
Rule 26.

Appeals.

(3) An appeal may be taken by the
prosecution from:
(a)

a final judgment of dismissal.

Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides:
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds
of prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations
of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.
Utah Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
Rule 702. Testimony by experts.
If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise.
Article I, § 12 of the Constitution of Utah provides:
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person and by
counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife
shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall
any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense.

APPENDIX 2
OFFICER SPANN'S PRELIMINARY HEARING TESTIMONY
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DIRECT

EXAMINATION

BY MR. MATHESON:
3
4

Q.

Please state your full name and spell it

for the record.

5

A.

Russell Edward Span,

6

Q.

By whom are you employed?

7

A.

West Valley City Police Department.

8

Q.

And what is your position there?

9

A.

I'm a patrol sergeant.

10

Q.

And how long have you held that position?

11

A.

Since April 19th, 1987.

12

Q.

Sergeant Span, on June 15, 1987, did you

13

S-p-a-n.

receive a call to go to the residence of John Quas?

14

A.

Yes, sir, I did.

15

Q.

And did you go to that residence?

16

A.

Yes, sir, I did.

17

Q.

What time did you arrive?

18

A.

2148 hours.

19

Q.

And after your

9:48 p.m.
arrival at the Quas

20

residence, did there come a time when you entered the

21

home itself?

22

A.

Yes, there did.

23

Q.

And upon entry what did you discover?

24

A.

I found Mrs. Quas laying prone in the

25

living room area suffering from a gun shot wound to

the
2

3

face.

I

Qhad

And to reur Personal

any police

or paramedics

knowledge,

moved

4

A.

No, they had

not.

5

Q-

And

Sergeant,

6

procedure

7

under

8
9
10

with respect

these

to touching

To sustain

of the body;

if not,

a live

at all to protect
Did you

12

A.

Yes, I did .

13

Q.

When did

14

A.

Approximately

16
\7
18

Q.

is standard

or moving a body

at the

be no movement

the crime

Q-

I arrived

what

there would be movement

there would

H [

\5

the body?

circumstances?

A-

body

in fact,

Sergeant,

talk with

that

scene.

John

Quas?

conversation
three

of t h e

take

place?

to five minutes

after

residence.

And where did

that

conversation

take

place?
A.

First

in the hallway

in the residence,

19

which was at the top of the stairs, and then in the

30

kitchen

31
32
33

area .

Q.
hallway

Could you d e s c r i b e
in relation

A.

34

the north

35

stairway

to t h e rest

Y e s . It's a single
side of the road
that

more

specifically

the

of the house?
family residence.

facing

On

south there's a

leads up to their residence, a cement

s tairway
You walk into the residence and it's a
3

split-level residence.

4

the•right-hand of the stairway is the living room area

5

and straight ahead is the kitchen area and off to the

€

left is a hallway.

7

the left side of the hallway and one bedroom on the

8

far right end of the hallway and a bathroom on the

9

right side of the hallway.

10
11

Q.

You go up the stairs and off

I believe there's two bedrooms on

All right.

Now, did Mr. Quas say anything

about what he was doing when his wife had been shot?

12

A.

Yes, he did.

13

Q.

And what did he say?

14

A.

He stated that he was in the shower.

15

Q.

And did he say anything else?

16

A.

He stated that he was in the shower and

17

heard the gun shot and came out and found his wife

18

laying on the floor and then contacted 911.

19
20

Q.

Now, when you talked with Mr. Quas did you

have an opportunity to observe his appearance?

21

A.

Yes, I did.

22

Q.

And could you describe his appearance

23
24
25

during that time when you were talking to him?
A.

He was wearing a long dark robe.

It

appeared that his hair was wet on the top, but not

1

soaked

2

dirty .

3
4

to the roots and his hands were

Q.

Did you

take an opportunity

A*

6

that hallway

7

mat down

8

Yes, I did.

about

There was a plastic

and I did not observe

the hallway

Q.

10

Did

A.

towards

the

the observations

Yes, they did.

Mr. Quas

12

hallway

13

area

into the kitchen

15

A.

At that

16

in the bathroom

17

shower

18

dry.

the

the

bathroom

area.

the floor was dry
observed

bathroom

And when did this inspection
take

that

the

A.

of the

place?

It would have been within

15 minutes

arrival.

23

Q.

At the

24

A.

Yes.

25

down

area, the bath tub and the side walls, were

Q.

my

able to get

there?

time I observed

area and I further

told us

action?

and went into the bathroom
And what did you find

21

just

area, I walked

Q.

19

you've

to the first door on the right,

anyway,

that

bathroom.

Once we were

14

22

th

runner o

any water on

lead you to take any further

11

20

to observe

hallway?

5

9

extremely

residence?

Do you recall what you did

after

afte

1

inspecting

2

A.

the

bathroom?

I went

back

3

at which

time I heard

4

basement

area.

5

basement

area and

6

and

stopped

7
8

Q.
Quas

9

I then went down

And

after

12

to Nevada.

13

the washing

he stated

MR. MATHESON:

15

did you hear Mr.
machine?

to my

stopping

that he was washing

BY MS.

clothes

Thank you,

to take

Sergeant.

I

questions.

JOHNSON:

Q.

Sergeant

18

when you arrived

19

other

Span, you arrived

at the scene

at the scene on June 15th how many

officers were

there at that

time?

20

A.

Two other

21

Q.

On June 15th you made all of

observations, did you

23

A.

Yes,

24

Q.

You made

25

the

CROSS-EXAMINATION

17

22

running

that he and his wife were going

have no further

in the

the stairs to the

that happened,

In reference

for a vacation

area,

machine.

A.

Yes.

the hallway

the washing machine

about

11

16

found

say anything

washing machine

into

the washing machine going

the washing

10

14

outside

Quas's

officers.
these

not?

ma'am.

appearance,

the observations

did you

not?

concerning

Mr.

--

2 I
3

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you write

Sergeant

a report

A.

I taped

5

Q.

And when did you do

6

A.

That

7

Q.

And did you provide

Detective

9

A.

10

records

11

Q.

a report.

The tape report
division

to be

tape report

to

All right.

then available

was

turned

into our

transcribed.
And

13

all of this information

14

correct?

so all of that

on the evening

that you

I'm not sure

I understand.

tape

to the records division.

17

that

the tape was not

observed

I provided

However,

I found

the

later

transcribed.

18

Q.

All right.

19

checked

the bathro.om about

20

arrived

at the Quas home,

21

A.

Yes, ma'am.

22

Q.

Okay.

Now, you testified
15 minutes
is that

open

in the

24

A.

No, I did

25

Q.

Do you recall whether

that you

after you

right?

Did you observe whether

there were any windows

information

at the Quas home, is that

16

23

that

Edwards?

was

A.

that?

evening.

12

15

all of this,

Span?

4

8

about

or not

bathroom?

not.
there were

windows

1

open in the bathroom?

2 I

A•

I don f t recall .

Q.

Do you recall what

the temperature was in

4 I the home?
5

A.

No, I do not.

6

Q.

Do you recall what the temperature

7

outside?

8

A.

No, ma'am,

9

Q.

Could you describe what

10

like

11
12

I do not.
the weather was

that night?
A.

the best

It was warm.

It was June 15th.

That's

I can recall.

13

Q.

I didn't catch that last

14

A.

It was June

15

Q.

June 15th?

16

A.

Yes, ma'am.

17

Q.

Would it be fair to say it was

18

was

statement?

15th.

summery

weather?

19

A.

Yes, ma'am.

20

Q.

Concerning the observations you made, the

21

washing machine running, all of that was made on June

22

the

23

15th?
A.

Yes, ma'am.

24

MS. JOHNSON:

25

THE COURT:

No further questions.
Mr. Matheson.

1
2

MR. MATHESON:

THE COURT:

MR. MATHESON:

MS. REMAL:
Sergeant

9

Span leaving

MR. MATHESON:

11

MS.

12

MR. MATHESON:

13

slightly

14

Honor.

15

REMAL:

Detective

17

else.

Thank you.

you were

21

readmission.

for their

THE COURT:

We're

intended

going

order, Your

that we had

sworn

looking

someone

going

for

out of

order.

Your Honor, as you'll

recall, we marked six exhibits
I think at this

Court.

fine.

I knew

20 I hearing.

to

to.

the

That's

MR. MATHESON:

to check

arrived.

with

Edwards but you were

I suspected

18

23

next

I think he may wish to

out of the originally

THE COURT:

16

has

if he wants

leave, if that's all right

22

Your

We have no objection

10

19

step down.

Your Honor, I need

to see if the next witness

7
8

You may

witness.

5
6

Your

Honor.

3
4

No further questions,

at the last

time I would

I don't

preliminary

like to move

think you have to do

that, do you?

24

MR. MATHESON:

25

THE COURT:

I don't

You want

know.

to be extra

cautious.

APPENDIX 3
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 5 THROUGH 11
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INSTRUCTION NO.

£^

It becomes my duty as judge to instruct you concerning the
law applicable to this case, and it is your duty as jurors to
follow the law as I shall state it to you.
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that
are presented by the allegations in the Information filed in this
court and the defendant's plea of Mnot guilty".

This duty you

should perform uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion
or prejudice against him.

You must not suffer yourselves to be

biased against the defendant because of the fact that he has been
arrested for this offense, or because an Information has been filed
against him, or because he has been brought before the court to
stand trial.

None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you

are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them
that he is more likely to be guilty than innocent.
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in
this trial and the law as stated to you by me. ' The law forbids
you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion,
prejudice, public opinion ot public feeling.

Both the State of

Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and
expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately consider
and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you will
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such
verdict may be.
of each juror.

The verdict must express the individual opinion
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At times throughout the trial the court has been called
upon to determine whether certain offered evidence might properly be admitted.

You are not to be concerned with the reasons

for such rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them.
Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a question
of law.

In admitting evidence to which an objection is made,

the court does not determine what weight should be given such
evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness.
You are not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor
any evidence stricken out by the court; as to any question to
which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the
objection.
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All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are
in favor of innocence•

A defendant is presumed innocent until

he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

And in case of

a reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.
The burden

is on the State to prove the defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
doubt

does

not

require

proof

to

Proof beyond a reasonable
an

absolute

certainty.

A

reasonable doubt is based on reason and common sense and not on
speculation or imagination.

It is a doubt that is reasonable

in view of all of the evidence.

Proof beyond a reasonable

doubt must satisfy the mind and convince those who are bound to
act conscientiously upon such proof.
doubt

that

reasonable

men

and

A reasonable doubt is a
women

would

hold

after

consideration of the evidence or lack of evidence in the case.
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Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should
reconcile such conflict as far as you reasonably can.

But

where the conflict cannot be reconciled, you are the final
judges and must determine from the evidence what the facts
are.

There are no definite rules governing how you shall

determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or
how you shall determine what the facts in this case are.

But

you should carefully and conscientiously consider and compare
all of the testimony, and all of the facts and circumstances,
which have a bearing on any issue, and determine therefrom
what the facts are.

You are not bound to believe all that

the witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of
witnesses unless such testimony is reasonable and convincing
in view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence.
You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against
a fewer number in accordance with your honest convictions.

The

testimony of a witness known to have made false statements on
one matter is naturally less convincing on other matters.

So

if you believe a witness has wilfully testified falsely as to
any material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of
the testimony of such witness, or you may give it such weight
as you think it is entitled to.
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You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight of the evidence.

In judging the weight

of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses you have a
right to take into consideration their bias, their interest in
the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof
to testify fairly, if any is shown.

You may consider the wit-

nesses1 deportment upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of
their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want
of it, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand,
and their capacity to remember.

You should consider these matters

together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you
may believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the
witnesses f statement.
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You are instructed that the defendant is a competent
witness in his own behalf and his testimony should be received and given the same consideration as you give to that
of any other witness.

The fact that he stands accused of a

crime is no evidence of his guilt and is no reason for rejecting his testimony.

However, you should weigh his testimony

the same as you weigh the testimony of any other witness.
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The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the
opinion of a witness to be received in evidence. However, an
exception to this rule exists in the case of an expert witness.
An expert witness is a person who by education, study or experience has become an expert in any art, science, trade or
profession, and who is called as a witness to give this opinion
as to any such matter in which he is versed and which is material to the case. You should consider such expert opinion and
should weigh the reasons, if any, which are given for it. However, you are not bound by such an opinion.

You may give to it

the weight to which you deem it is entitled, whether that be
great or slight, and you may reject it entirely, if in your judgment the reasons given for it are unsound.

